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ABSTRACT 
The manuscript challenges the use of human dignity as an independent free 
speech justification. The articulation of free speech in human dignity terms 
carries unwarranted potential consequences that may result in limiting free 
speech rather than protecting it. This possible outcome makes human dignity 
inadequate as a free speech justification. 
The manuscript also demonstrates why articulations of the rationales behind 
the “argument from dignity” are either superfluous, since they are aptly covered 
by the “argument from autonomy,” or simply too broad and speech-restrictive to 
be considered a free speech justification. As a matter of principle, the nexus 
between freedom of speech and human dignity should be construed as inherently 
contentious.  
The manuscript combines theoretical and comparative analyses to 
demonstrate why European, and other western democracies are more susceptible 
to the use of human dignity, both in their constitutional doctrines and as a 
speech-restrictive term. Current American scholarship regarding dignity as a free 
speech justification neglects to recognize the harms of such discourse in a non-
American setting, as well as in the United States. Thus, unintentionally, 
advocates of free speech may actually promote a justification that eventually will 
lead to its restriction. For these reasons, the manuscript warns that inserting 
human dignity into the realm of free speech justifications may be analogous to 
inserting a “Trojan Horse,” with human dignity as “the enemy from within.”  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, human dignity has increasingly become a prevailing 
justification both for the protection and limitation of human rights 
internationally.1 At the same time, vagueness surrounds human dignity and its 
different possible interpretations, even in context-specific legal settings. While 
human dignity plays a limited role in the American legal system, its potency, 
influence, and even its literal meaning is far greater in other democracies.2 In 
 
1 Human dignity appears in prominent international documents and treaties, as well as in an 
increasing number of foreign constitutions as a fundamental right. See Jochen Abr. Frowein, 
Human Dignity in International Law, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
DISCOURSE 121 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002); Georg Nolte, European and U.S. 
Constitutionalism: Comparing Essential Elements, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM 9 
(Georg Nolte ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).  
2 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]; RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW (1996); Walter F. Murphy, Ordering 
of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703 (1980); Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a 
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those countries, human dignity often encompasses values such as equality, and 
serves as a platform to promote progressive liberal or communitarian ideas.3
Human dignity’s increasing influence leads to a growing tendency to evaluate 
rights, including freedom of expression, through its lens. 
The relationship between freedom of speech and human dignity is vague, 
ambiguous, and has not been sufficiently explored to date. Often the two 
conflict, and a proper balance between them is difficult to reach, as human 
dignity may be used as a justification for both protecting speech and restricting 
it. The goal of this analysis is to show the inadequacy of human dignity as an 
independent justification for free speech, and that it is preferable to view it and 
freedom of speech as contending rather than harmonious values. This manuscript 
offers a theoretical analysis regarding the incompatibility of human dignity as an 
independent justification for freedom of expression, and demonstrates how some 
western legal systems’ nearly exclusive focus on human dignity may prove 
unsatisfactory when dealing with free speech issues.  
The first segment reviews the evolution of freedom of expression in the 
United States in comparison with other western democracies. The second 
segment briefly reviews common justifications for freedom of expression 
through the “classical model” for free speech. This serves as background for the 
third segment, which assesses the appropriateness of human dignity as an 
independent free speech justification. This segment offers several parameters 
that assist in predicting whether a nation’s human dignity focus is likely to 
justify protecting speech or restricting it. These parameters are then applied to 
the United States and other western democracies to demonstrate why, in the 
United States, human dignity is likely to be construed as protecting free speech, 
whereas in other western democracies, human dignity is likely to be construed as 
restricting speech. Finally, due to the problematic nexus of human dignity and 
freedom of expression from both a theoretical and a comparative standpoint, 
driving a wedge between the two is recommended.   
 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE UNITED STATES IN 
COMPARISON TO OTHER WESTERN DEMOCRACIES   
Freedom of Expression is one of the most universally prominent rights, if not 
the most prominent right, in all democratic legal systems. Although the 
 
Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 HOW. L.J. 
145 (1984); James Q. Whitman, “Human Dignity” in Europe and the United States: The Social 
Foundation, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM 95 (Georg Nolte ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2005). 
3 See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 298 passim (2nd ed. 1997); David Kretzmer, Human Dignity in Israeli 
Jurisprudence, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 161 (David 
Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002). 
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protection of freedom of expression was not developed in most western 
democracies fifty or even thirty years ago, most democracies have started 
developing protective freedom of expression jurisprudence in the past ten to 
twenty-five years.4 Currently, freedom of expression is considered a prominent 
right among virtually all western democracies, yet its scale and scope varies 
among different systems. The United States is probably the most protective of 
(most)5 speech rights among western democracies – a phenomenon that receives 
the label “American Exceptionalism.”6
Free expression rights are initially structured in accordance with nations’ 
common conceptions of those rights, as well as the durability of nations’ derived 
rules to withstand change over time.  In the United States, freedom of expression 
doctrines crystallized long before other western democracies. The First 
Amendment was drafted and ratified more than two centuries ago, and although 
a small portion of its development happened in the nineteenth century,7 most of 
its development by the Supreme Court began in the early twentieth century.8 The 
roots of the First Amendment and its understandings are planted in libertarianism 
and the Enlightenment.9 These characteristics are also manifested in the 
 
4 See Fredrick Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication in Europe and the United 
States: A Case Study in Comparative Constitutional Architecture, in EUROPEAN AND US 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 47, 53-56 (Georg Nolte ed., Council of Europe Publishing 2005) 
[hereinafter Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication].  
5 See, e.g., Roger Errera, Freedom of Speech in Europe and in the USA, in EUROPEAN AND 
US CONSTITUTIONALISM 25, 43-44 (Georg Nolte ed., Council of Europe Publishing 2005) 
(regarding the issue of the protection of journalists’ sources as an exception to this rule).  
6 To be precise, the phenomenon of “American Exceptionalism” is broader concept than just 
regarding freedom of expression, and refers to the major themes in which the United States 
diverges from most western democracies, such as the death penalty, compliance with some 
international law norms, etc. See generally Fredrick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, 
in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) 
[hereinafter Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment].  
7 See generally DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997); JUHANI 
RUDANKO, THE FORGING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH: ESSAYS ON ARGUMENTATION IN 
CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND ON THE SEDITION ACT (2003). 
8 The modern era of freedom of expression adjudication in the Supreme Court is commonly 
considered to begin with a series of important 1919 cases, such as Schenk v. Unites States, 249 
U.S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); and Debs v. United States, 249 
U.S. 211 (1919). See Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication, supra note 4, at 54.  
9 See LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 44-45 (1998) (“The classical vision of free 
speech has antecedents stretching far back in time. The primary connection is with the period of 
Enlightenment, in the eighteenth century, when the interest and faith in man’s powers and reason 
flourished and when there occurred that enormously important revolution in the way people 
conceived of the relationship between the state and the individual members of society. Two 
cardinal premises about social organizations arose from this transformation in thought: first, that 
the government is possessed of only limited political powers, which it derives from the citizenry; 
second, that the people themselves, as the ultimate sovereign, are competent to determine their 
own destiny.”). Id.
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“Absolutist view” of the First Amendment – a view which currently dominates 
First Amendment understandings.10 The founding fathers’ Lockeian influences 
and their libertarian perception of rights have affected general perceptions of 
rights in the United States, particularly freedom of expression.11 
The formative years of First Amendment jurisprudence by the Supreme 
Court occurred during the Lochner Era,12 as well as during the early New Deal 
period.13 The durability of the First Amendment rules formed during these years 
allowed them to withstand influences and trends that were incompatible with the 
“Lochnerian paradigm.”14 Although the Court seemed to be more susceptible to 
progressive liberal notions towards the middle of the twentieth century, at least in 
certain free speech contexts,15 these trends did not last.16 For the most part, the 
few minor influences that may be ascribed to this period have been later 
overruled or lost much of their stamina. For instance, several non-libertarian 
trends in the 1950s-1960s that were articulated, for example, in Chaplinsky,17 
were later abandoned and marginalized by the Burger Court rulings. Thus, in 
 
10 See Guy E. Carmi, Comparative Notions of Fairness: Comparative Perspectives on the 
Fairness Doctrine With Special Emphasis on Israel and the United States, 4 VA. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 275, 291-92 (2005).  
11 This is somewhat of a generalization, since progressive liberal thought regarding the First 
Amendment existed in early periods. See DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN 
YEARS 211-47 (1997); David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 951 (1996). Nonetheless, this claim that the foundations of the First Amendment are 
libertarian is an appropriate portrayal. It does not mean, however, that other non-libertarian 
accounts of freedom of expression are incorrect, or that an originalist interpretation would yield 
only a libertarian outcome. Cf. David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 539 (2001). 
12 See Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 6, at 31 n.4. Cf. ROBERT POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 8-10 (1995) (claiming that the Court has redefined its 
understandings of the First Amendment since the New Deal Era and that “as a consequence the 
First Amendment was fundamentally reinterpreted along democratic lines.”). Id. at 9. I agree 
with this observation, yet the libertarian instincts (as opposed to property related instincts that 
also characterized the Lochner Era) with regards to the First Amendment remain unchanged 
since the early free speech rulings in the Lochner Era. 
13 The Court has continued its line of protective free speech rulings, even in the context of 
protecting labor unions’ speech, especially in a series of rulings in 1937.  See, e.g., De Jonge v. 
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). 
14 The resilience of First Amendment jurisprudence in the United States derives in large part 
from its rule-based characterization. Cf. Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 
6, at 54-56.   
15 See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding group defamation 
legislation); Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the constitutionality of the 
fairness doctrine). 
16 See, e.g., Carmi, supra note 10, at 287-96.  
17 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (creating the “fighting words 
doctrine.”). Also cf. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).  
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Cohen18 and subsequent cases,19 American free expression doctrines, such as the 
fighting words doctrine, became more libertarian.20 
Current First Amendment jurisprudence may be generally characterized as 
derived from classical libertarian understandings of a negative and a “modest” 
right. The laissez faire approach to freedom of expression in the United States 
still reigns, and a positive right approach is rejected.21 Because this basic 
jurisprudence evolved during a libertarian era, and since freedom of expression 
is a relatively “old” right, it is normally classified as a “liberty” kind of right, 
although a free speech principle must be distinct from a principle of general 
liberty.22 In fact, freedom of expression is often referred to as “the liberty of 
speech.” Freedom of speech seems to receive a heightened protection vis-à-vis 
other rights, and justifications strong enough for general restrictions on liberty 
may not be sufficient to restrict speech.23 This characteristic is universal, yet is 
more evident in the American legal system, whose freedom of expression 
protection stands out from that found in other western democracies.24 This core 
 
18 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (ruling that a shirt with the inscription “Fuck the 
Draft” is protected speech, and does not constitute “fighting words”).   
19 See, e.g., Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 
(1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 910 
(1972); Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First Amendment, 60 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 629, 635, n.26 (1985). 
20 Cf. Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First Amendment, 60 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 629, 635-36 (1985) (“Following Cohen, the Court applied this new 
libertarian approach to fighting words cases.”). See also discussion infra in Part III.B.2.c. 
21 See Susan Brison, The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech, 108 ETHICS 312, 339 (1998) 
[hereinafter Brison, Autonomy Defense] (quoting Aaron Director as saying that “free speech [is] 
the only area where laissez faire is still respectable.”).  
22 Cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 7-8 (1984) 
[hereinafter SCHAUER, PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY], Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 121-23 (1989) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications]. 
Nonetheless, the core of freedom of expression’s classical understandings is heavily linked to the 
conceptions of liberty. For elaboration on classical negative rights see discussion in infra Part 
III.B.2.c. 
23 See, e.g., Brison, Autonomy Defense, supra note 21, at 320; KENT GREENAWALT,
FIGHTING WORDS 3 (1996) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS]; Greenawalt, Free 
Speech Justifications, supra note 22, at 120. 
24 For elaboration on the phenomenon of American Exceptionalism in the realm of free 
speech see Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 6, Yet it should be noted that 
American constitutional law provides additional protections of individual liberties not found in 
other European countries.  For example, criminal procedures such as the fruit of the poisonous 
tree doctrine do not exist in European countries, nor does a right to a jury trial or other civil 
rights.  See, e.g., Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, Did God say, ‘You shall not eat of any tree of 
the garden?’ Rethinking the “Fruits of the Poisonous Tree” in Israeli Constitutional Law 
OXFORD U. COMP. L. F. 4, (2005), available at http://www.ouclf.iuscomp.org. Therefore, since 
these rights are better protected in the U.S., even if European countries provide a relatively 
robust protection to freedom of expression vis-à-vis other rights, American Exceptionalism in 
free speech protection most likely does not stem from a degradation of freedom of expression as 
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classical understanding of freedom of expression may require some non-liberty 
considerations to camouflage as liberty-related so to justify their use in this 
“liberty” kind of right. This may explain why considerations from another order 
(i.e. human dignity) use “liberty” terminology such as autonomy, or classify the 
use of human dignity as “dignity-based liberalism.25”
Rule-based First Amendment jurisprudence has generally been successful in 
delimiting the types of admissible arguments when it comes to free speech. 
These rules stabilize constitutional discourse and applicable terminology in the 
realm of free speech.26 Therefore, the understandings that are attached to the 
First Amendment and its jurisprudence became rule-based, and to a great extent 
fixed,27 at a time when other perceptions of rights, particularly human dignity,28 
either did not exist or were not substantiated enough to claim the lead.29 
In contrast to the United States, freedom of expression jurisprudence in most 
western democracies began evolving in the past ten to twenty-five years.30 
opposed to other rights in other democracies. In other words, if we look at protection of other 
rights as a threshold from which the protection of freedom of expression should be elevated, then 
all western democracies follow this line of free speech protection, at least to a certain extent.  
25 Cf. EDWARD J. EBRELE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY 
AND THE UNITED STATES xii (2002) [hereinafter EBRELE].  
26 For elaboration on the rule-based see Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra 
note 6, at 55-56; Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1275, 1312-16 (2002); David L. Faigman, Constitutional Adventures in Wonderland: Exploring 
the Debate Between Rules and Standards Through the Looking Glass of the First Amendment, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 829, 841 (1993). 
27 This rule-based characteristic of First Amendment jurisprudence is a “managerial 
argument” that may explain why doctrinal change in the United States occurs more slowly than 
in other western democracies. Stare decisis serves as a buffer that moderates change and 
promotes stability. This relatively slower change in the American constitutional jurisprudence 
vis-à-vis other western democracies may be yet another explanation for American 
Exceptionalism. The non-rule-based constitutional jurisprudence that characterizes western 
democracies facilitates more frequent discussions regarding the “balancing” of different rights 
albeit stare decisis plays a role in these systems as well. It seems the American system prefers 
stability on constant debate regarding its values, when compared to other legal systems. See 
ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 4-6 (1995). 
28 As elaborated below, human dignity has emerged as a constitutional concept primarily at 
the end of World War II, in the middle of the twentieth century. By then, much of the First 
Amendment jurisprudence had been outlined and crystallized. See infra note 34 and 
accompanying text.  
29 For example, ideas that were promoted by scholars such as David Riesman, Democracy 
and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 727 (1942) and adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) were later rejected in R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). See Robert M. O’Neil, Rights in Conflict: The First 
Amendment's Third Century, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 23-26 (2002). 
30 See Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication, supra note 4, at 54. Although the 
United Kingdom, for example, had a relatively robust free speech protection, their free speech 
doctrines were not as developed as their American counterpart. In particular, the lack of judicial 
review restricted the remedies in free speech cases. See generally DAVID STREET, FREEDOM, THE 
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During this period, the more “fashionable” rights in Europe had a non-libertarian 
character.31 Social and positive rights were increasingly recognized in western 
countries, many of which even defined themselves as welfare states. In addition, 
during the same period, scholarly writings reframed problematic speech, such as 
hate speech and pornography, in terms of inequality, rather than regulation of 
civility and morality.32 Therefore, when some non-American courts dealt with 
these kinds of speech, they viewed them differently from American courts in the 
sixties. This may partially explain substantial differences in free expression 
jurisprudence that divide the United States from the majority of western 
democracies, including most European States, Canada, New Zealand, and 
Australia.33 
Furthermore, post World War II European human rights discourse, which 
introduced human dignity as a central constitutional value and pivotal right, is 
founded upon different philosophical heritages. These include Hegelian, 
Kantian, and even theological Judeo-Christian perceptions of rights.34 Although 
there is no consensus as to both the origins and the present conception of human 
dignity, its most prevalent understandings are non-libertarian, as opposed to the 
American Lockeian tradition. 
Freedom of expression in western democracies is viewed as an integral part 
of general constitutional law, whereas in the United States it is perceived as a 
more independent field. Therefore, general constitutional doctrines affect 
freedom of expression doctrines in most western democracies to a greater extent 
than they do in the United States. For example, in most western democracies, 
freedom of expression may be also considered as a “positive right,” rather than 
merely a libertarian negative right, as in the United States.35 Also, the distinction 
between the public and private spheres plays a significant role in determining 
some free speech doctrines, such as the regulation of media.36 
INDIVIDUAL, AND THE LAW (1963). 
31 Cf. Winfried Brugger, Comment, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM 69, 72-74 
(Georg Nolte ed., Council of Europe Publishing 2005). 
32 See, e.g., the writings of Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon; Mari J. Matsuda, 
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 
(1989).  
33 It appears that the comparative argument, according to which the United States should 
align with the other western democracies and restrict radical speech, is generally unpersuasive in 
the American context. Cf. Brison, Autonomy Defense, supra note 21, at 339 (1998); Mark 
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999). 
34 Cf. Brugger, supra note 31, at 72-74; Winfried Brugger, Communitarianism as the Social 
and Legal Theory behind the German Constitution, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 431 (2004). Also, see, 
for example, Dietrich Ritschl, Can Ethical Maxims be Derived From Theological Concepts of 
Human Dignity, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 87 (David 
Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002). 
35 See Carmi, supra note 10, at 300-05.  
36 See id. at 286 and passim. See also Eric Barendt, The First Amendment and the Media, in 
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Because of their relatively young ages, free expression doctrines in other 
western democracies are still undergoing formative processes. They are less 
restrained by existing doctrine, and, unlike the United States, their free 
expression doctrines may be characterized as non-rule-based.37 Instead, these 
countries frequently utilize concepts of “balancing” and “proportionality.” In 
particular, freedom of speech is balanced with other values, rights, and 
interests.38 Among these values and rights, human dignity surfaces prominently 
in many western democracies, particularly in Germany, where it receives 
heightened status vis-à-vis other rights.  
Thus, as will be demonstrated later, while the United States views freedom of 
speech through the lens of “liberty,” other western democracies increasingly 
think of freedom of expression in dignity terms. The predominance of “human 
dignity” as a constitutional value in many western democracies has caused an 
increasing number of them to redefine freedom of expression issues in “dignity” 
terms.39 In these countries human dignity may serve as an internal limitation on 
free speech. At the very least, dignity concerns in these countries are recognized 
when freedom of speech cases are adjudicated and balanced vis-à-vis free 
speech, creating an external limitation on freedom of expression.40 
It is important to understand that the American libertarian free speech 
paradigm is not completely rejected by other democracies. Such democracies 
often utilize a similar approach when core and classical freedom of expression 
issues are involved.41 This is true, in particular, in cases of governmental 
censorship and prior restraint.42 In these fields, the libertarian perceptions that 
stem from the fear of excessive state control of speech are commonly shared by 
 
IMPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICAN, ENGLISH AND 
EUROPEAN LAW 29 (Ian Loveland ed., 1998), ERIC M. BARENDT, BROADCASTING LAW: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 50-95 (1995). 
37 See Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication, supra note 4, at 49-51, 61-63; Schauer, 
The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 6, at 53-56. 
38 On the distinction between these constitutional terms see infra text accompanying notes 
136-38. 
39 Among these countries are Germany, South Africa, and Israel. See discussion infra in Part 
II.B.1.  
40 These countries include virtually all other western democracies, such as Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, etc. See discussion supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
41 See, e.g., Fredrick Schauer, The Ontology of Censorship, in CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING 
147, 147 (Robert Post ed., 1988).  
42 Compare Errera, supra note 5, at 32 (referring to a relatively narrow “margin of 
appreciation” in the ECHR free expression jurisprudence when it comes to issues of prior 
restraint, as opposed to a wider margin when dealing with issues such as enforcement of 
morality), with Andrew Oliver, The Proposed European Union Ban on Television Advertising 
Targeting Children: Would it Violate European Human Rights Law?, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L 
& COMP. L. 501, 517 (2000) (arguing that when the legitimacy of free speech limitation is 
founded on the protection of morals, “the ECHR gives the member States a wide latitude in 
determining what morals are, and what is needed to protect them.”). 
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democracies, especially regarding political speech.43 Nonetheless, as general 
attitudes about free expression move further away from core classical paradigms, 
other democracies increasingly recognize additional considerations that warrant 
limitations and restrictions on free speech. This is especially true regarding 
“problematic speech,”44 as well as media regulation.45 
Although understanding freedom of expression as derived from the narrow 
principles of liberty in the classic liberal paradigm is very beneficial when 
thinking about free speech, it is an insufficient explanation per se. It is therefore 
necessary to briefly review the theoretical justifications for free speech in order 
to demonstrate the incompatibility of human dignity as a central justification for 
free speech.  
 
II. THE THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR  
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION – AN OVERVIEW   
Freedom of expression has several underlying justifications that are 
commonly used to explicate the strong defense afforded to speech.46 Briefly 
reviewing the basic purposes behind the “rule” of free speech is important in 
order to evaluate the compatibility of human dignity as a justification for free 
speech. As this paper endeavors to show, human dignity is not suitable to 
accommodate freedom of expression. Human dignity fails as an overarching 
justification for freedom of expression to appropriately cover some of the core 
protected speech. It also confers excessive protection on speech that is protected 
according to current understandings.  
Many legal scholars and philosophers have attempted to define the 
underlying justification for freedom of expression. These different accounts 
sometimes offer similar descriptions of the same rationales.47 The subtleties 
 
43 See also discussion infra, Part II.A.2. (regarding the increased popularity of the 
“arguments from democracy” as part of the general ontology of First Amendment jurisprudence, 
which heavily relies on this argument when dealing with all kinds of speech).  
44 “Problematic speech” stands for all speech that democracies other than the United States 
limit (i.e. hate speech, Holocaust denial, and in some cases, pornography). Defamation may also 
fall under this category in certain respects. The term is a useful shorthand for kinds of speech that 
are restricted by some or most other western democracies. Cf. BOLLINGER, supra note 9, at 76-
103 (referring to these kinds of speech as “problematic.”).  
45 For example, the non-American approach may be characterized as fitting into the 
“Madisonian” approach to free speech, as opposed to the American approach that is “absolutist” 
at its core.  See, e.g., Carmi, supra note 10, at 290-96, 300-05.  
46 Cf. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1054-60 (5th ed. 2005).  
47 See Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 22 (counting the following 
consequentialist justifications: truth discovery; interest accommodation and social stability; 
exposure to deterrence and abuses of authority; autonomy and personal development; liberal 
democracy; and the promotion of tolerance). See id. (Greenawalt also lists the following 
nonconsequentialist justifications: social contract theory; recognition of autonomy and 
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some of these writings offer are not directly relevant in defining the rapport 
between freedom of expression and human dignity, and, therefore I will refrain 
from delving deeply into such nuances. Suffice it to say that the brief account 
offered below demonstrates how dignity concerns are far from the core of the 
common justifications for free speech, and are, at best, in the penumbra of these 
justifications. Therefore, human dignity cannot stand as a primary prism through 
which freedom of expression is viewed.  
A common and helpful way to distinguish between different free speech 
justifications is to divide them into consequential and nonconsequential 
arguments.48 Consequential reasons for protecting free speech focus on the 
positive effects of liberty, whereas nonconsequential reasons claim that, 
independent from consequences, the restriction of speech denies a right or 
constitutes an injustice.49 
A.  The Classical Model  
 
Three main free speech justifications (or clusters of justifications) are widely 
referred to as “the classical model.50” This model offers explanations regarding 
the “core” of free speech – the speech that is truly valued by society.51 While 
theorists disagree regarding which identifiable “values” ought to be given 
precedence over others,52 the “truth” and “democratic” arguments are generally 
perceived as the most powerful free speech justifications, especially in the 
United States. This paper will first review these two justifications, later 
elaborating on the additional “autonomy related” justification, since it is the only 
justification from the classical model that may be directly linked to human 
dignity.  
 
rationality; dignity and equality; and the marketplace of ideas). Cf. Brison, Autonomy Defense,
supra note 21, at 321 (accounting for several justifications including: the argument from truth; 
the argument from diversity; the argument from democracy; the argument from distrust; the 
argument from tolerance; the pressure release argument; and the slippery slope argument).  
48 See Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 22, at 127-30. 
49 GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 23, at 3. 
50 It is important to note that there are more theoretical justifications than the three presented. 
The classical model falls short of offering a satisfactory explanation to the level of protection that 
freedom of expression receives, especially in the United States. Several theorists have articulated 
other justifications, or dissected the justifications into sub-justifications. See Brison, Autonomy 
Defense, supra note 21, at 320-21. However, the three justifications I have chosen to briefly 
present are used by many as the major classifications, and are known as the classical model. Cf. 
BOLLINGER, supra note 9, at 43-75. Lee Bollinger’s “fortress model” and Vince Balsi’s 
“checking value” deserve a special mention among the justifications listed above.  
51 BOLLINGER, supra note 9, at 44.  
52 See BOLLINGER, supra note 9, at 44. 
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1. The Argument from Truth 
 
The “discovery of truth” rationale is probably the most familiar 
consequentialist argument. It is mostly identified with the writings of John Stuart 
Mill and the eloquent Supreme Court opinions of Oliver Wendell Holmes and 
Louis Brandeis.53 At the core of this argument is the notion that free speech is 
the best tool to discover truth and prove falsehood.54 According to this argument, 
the “marketplace of ideas55” is the best mechanism to reach truth, and regulation 
of speech may eventually stifle truth instead of promoting it.56 While this 
argument from truth has been a prominent and popular justification for the 
protection of free speech, it is second to the cluster of arguments relating to 
democracy and self-governance, especially in the American context. 
 
2. The Argument from Democracy  
 
The argument from democracy and self-governance is most closely identified 
with the work of Alexander Meiklejohn.57 It is considered to be the most 
prominent justification for the protection of free speech. The argument focuses 
on the importance of free speech for enabling the citizenry to self-govern. The 
ethos of free expression in the United States is closely linked to this rationale, 
and the evolutionary development of free speech doctrines suggests that political 
speech stands at the core of First Amendment protection.58 Historical events such 
as the McCarthy Era and the Vietnam War contributed to the American 
understanding of the First Amendment as a tool for protecting political speech.59 
Political speech receives the highest protection in every legal system, but in the 
United States this protection exceeds that afforded in many other western 
democracies, as demonstrated by such policies as the content neutrality doctrine 
and the clear and present danger test.60 
The popularity of the argument from democracy is unparalleled, and it is 
considered the most influential justification in the development of twentieth 
century free speech doctrines both in the United States and elsewhere.61 
53 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859); RAPHAEL COHEN-ALMAGOR, THE 
BOUNDARIES OF LIBERTY AND TOLERANCE 145-47 (1994).  
54 Cf. Brison, Autonomy Defense, supra note 21, at 321. 
55 For elaboration upon the sources of the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor, see Charles W. 
Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality of 
Broadcasting Regulation, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1717-18 (1997). 
56 Cf. MILL, supra note 53, STONE, supra note 46, at 1054-56.  
57 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (Harper & Brothers, 1948).  
58 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
59 Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 6, at 47-49.  
60 See id. at 48. Cf. Frowein, supra note 1, at 33.  
61 Cf. ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 20-23 (1985), Greenawalt, Free Speech 
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Nonetheless, the centrality of the arguments from democracy in the United States 
is greater than in other legal systems, and First Amendment doctrines and 
conceptions are primarily derived from this justification.62 The primacy of the 
argument from democracy in the American setting is exemplified by the 
classification of pornography as political speech.63 Other democracies, while 
recognizing the importance of these arguments, seem less prone to using 
democracy rationales to justify free speech protection, instead favoring other 
justifications from the plethora of existing free speech justifications.64 America’s 
reliance on the arguments from democracy in forming its First Amendment 
jurisprudence, especially in non-political contexts, is quite unique. This legal-
cultural aspect of American free expression jurisprudence may serve as yet 
another explanation for American Exceptionalism. 
 
3. The Argument from Autonomy  
 
Another cluster of justifications regarding underlying purposes of free speech 
is the autonomy defense, which is also related to self-fulfillment. Many theorists 
have attempted to shed light on this argument, and arguably, the autonomy 
defense of free speech is the one most commonly used by liberal legal and 
political theorists.65 Brison counts as many as six different philosophical 
accounts of autonomy.66 Principally, the argument from autonomy maintains that 
not respecting an individual’s choice to speak—or to receive others’ speech—
infringes upon that person’s right to autonomy.67 Most accounts of the autonomy 
defense are non-consequentialist, and therefore, according to Brison, aim to 
show why the right to free speech is immune to balancing.68 
There is no need to dwell in depth upon all the different philosophical 
accounts Brison offers in order to realize that the vagueness of this term and its 
different philosophical meanings renders a complex outcome. Most of the 
 
Justifications, supra note 22, at 145 (1989).  
62 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 104-05 (Harper & Brothers, 1948); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 255, 301 (1992) (saying that “the First Amendment is principally about political 
deliberation.”). See also Gregory Magarian, Substantive Due Process as a Source of 
Constitutional Protection for Nonpolitical Speech, 90 MINN. L. REV. 247 (2005). 
63 See American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324 (1985), aff'd 475 U.S. 
1001 (1986); Alon Harel, Bigotry, Pornography, and the First Amendment: A Theory of 
Unprotected Speech, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1887 (1992). Also cf. CATHERINE MACKINNON, ONLY 
WORDS 92-93 (1993).  
64 For a good account of prevalent free speech justifications see generally Greenawalt, Free 
Speech Justifications, supra note 22. See also supra note 50.  
65 See Brison, Autonomy Defense, supra note 21, at 312-13.  
66 Id.
67 Brison, Autonomy Defense, supra note 21, at 322. 
68 Id.
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accounts Brison presents favor the protection of free speech even when hate 
speech and pornography are involved. Yet, one of the six accounts Brison 
reviews justifies restricting these kinds of speech due to autonomy 
considerations.69 Therefore, autonomy cannot serve as a magic bullet to solve the 
issue of “problematic speech,” and it may send mixed signals as to the propriety 
of restricting various kinds of speech. Nonetheless, as discussed below, 
autonomy’s mainstream understandings are still far more speech-protective than 
their human dignity counterparts.   
Those who use the autonomy argument to protect all kinds of speech, 
including “problematic speech,” emphasize the notion that the state cannot 
paternalistically dictate to its citizenry which views are “correct.”70 Dworkin, for 
example, argues that restricting people’s speech, as well as limiting people’s 
access to other’s speech, out of contempt for their way of life or their view of 
good, violates their right to autonomy or moral independence.71 Such restriction 
unacceptably fails to treat these people with equal respect and concern.72 
Suppression of certain views represents a kind of contempt for citizens that is 
objectionable independent of its consequences. When suppression favors some 
points of view over others, it does not treat citizens equally.73 
Such aspects of the autonomy defense of free speech can be articulated in 
terms of “dignity,” “equality,” and “liberty.”74 Yet this account may be 
somewhat misleading, since it depends on the content one ascribes to those 
terms. The autonomy defense is more compatible with the meanings of these 
constitutional terms as they are commonly viewed in the United States, but those 
same terms tend to receive other emphases in other western countries.75 This 
account focuses on the speaker more than his listeners, and is, in fact, closely 
related to general concepts of “liberty.”76 
The autonomy defense is often linked with artistic speech or speech that 
defines personality (e.g. speech relating to our sexual identity or personal 
appearance), since these kinds of speech lie close to how people conceive 
themselves.77 Such speech is more closely connected to the autonomy argument, 
 
69 See Brison, Autonomy Defense, supra note 21, at 336-38 
70 Id. at 316.  
71 See RONALD M. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 353 (1986). 
72 See Brison, Autonomy Defense, supra note 21, at 339; Ronald Dworkin, The Coming 
Battles over Free Speech, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 11, 1992, at 58. 
73 Cf. Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 22, at 152-53. 
74 Cf. id. 
75 See discussion infra in Part III.B.2. 
76 Cf. Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 22, at 153 (“How to take this 
argument depends on whether any infringement of liberty impairs dignity and any infringement 
that is significantly selective impairs equality. […] The concerns about dignity and equality may 
seem not to be specially related to speech but to be arguments, perhaps rather weak ones, in favor 
of liberty generally.”). 
77 Cf. Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 22, at 153; Justice Dorner in 
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and therefore its protection primarily depends on how important this justification 
is in a specific legal system.  
The autonomy defense of free speech is of special interest for the purpose of 
this analysis, since some of its versions and some of the versions of human 
dignity may overlap. Therefore, when referring to human dignity as an argument 
for protecting free speech, one must refer to the autonomy argument. Yet, 
focusing solely on this argument for the protection of freedom of expression, 
while abandoning the other primary classical justifications (truth and 
democracy), offers only a partial foundation for this right. The other arguments 
are at least as important as the autonomy argument, if not more important.  
 
III. THE ARGUMENT FROM DIGNITY?
The nexus between Human Dignity and Freedom of Expression is 
problematic in nature. The inadequacy of human dignity as a principle 
justification for freedom of speech is reviewed by Frederick Schauer who 
remarks that “there is little to be gained by thinking of the right to freedom of 
speech as but the instantiation of a more general right to dignity,”78 leading to 
the declaration that “[s]peaking about dignity thus appears not to take us very far 
in thinking about the protection of freedom of speech.”79  
Nonetheless, human dignity is articulated by some scholars as a free speech 
justification. Human dignity is even considered a possible source for the 
incorporation of freedom of expression, where it is an unenumerated right.80 
Unfortunately, it is unclear what exactly the “argument from dignity” 
encompasses. A deeper look into the relationship between human dignity and 
freedom of expression reveals that it is perceived differently by different 
scholars.  
Should the “argument from dignity” be recognized as an independent 
theoretical free speech justification?  This paper claims that such a view would 
be mistaken primarily because it is either not sufficiently distinguishable from 
the argument from autonomy or it is too general to constitute a free speech 
justification per se. The following analysis is devoted to demonstrating why 
human dignity and freedom of expression are more appropriately conceived 
 
CrimA 4463/94 Golan v. The Penitentiary Service [1996] IsrSC 50(5) 136. 
78 Frederick Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN 
DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 178, 179 (Michael J. Mayer & William A. Parent, eds., 1992) 
[hereinafter Schauer, Speaking of Dignity]. Cf. Dani Statman, Two Concepts of KAVOD, 24 
IUNAI MISHPAT 541, 576-77 (2001).  
79 Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, supra note 78, at 190.  
80 For example, in a fashion similar to the incorporation of the unenumerated right to privacy 
into the Fourteenth Amendment in the United States, the Israeli Supreme Court has considered 
incorporating the unenumerated right of free speech into the Human Dignity Clause. See CrimA 
4463/94 Golan v. The Penitentiary Service [1996] IsrSC 50(5) 136.  
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separately rather than as connected.  
 
A.  Two Accounts of the “Argument from Dignity” 
 
What exactly do we mean when regarding the “argument from dignity”? 
When someone argues that her right to free speech is derived from her 
entitlement to dignity (or alternatively, that certain speech should be curtailed 
due to infringement of her dignity), what does this justification encompass? The 
vagueness surrounding the term “human dignity” clutters the ability to clearly 
define and demarcate the boundaries of this justification. In an attempt to restore 
the rationales behind this so-called free speech justification, this paper offers two 
possible accounts for the scope and meanings of the “argument from dignity.” 
 
1. A Minimalist Account  
 
The first account of the “argument from dignity” is a minimalist version of 
human dignity, as it purports to focus solely on the rights of speakers. It is 
intended to serve exclusively as a justification for protecting free speech and not 
as a justification for restricting it. Both Kent Greenawalt and Ronald Dworkin 
articulate similar justifications relying on dignity and equality as independent 
free speech justifications.  
Greenawalt’s brief account of dignity (and equality) strikingly resembles an 
argument presented earlier as part of the argument from autonomy. According to 
this view, suppression of certain views represents a kind of contempt for citizens 
that is inherently objectionable, independent of its consequences,81 because it 
fails to treat citizens equally or with the dignity they deserve.82 
Greenawalt also briefly mentions human dignity as stifling a person from 
expressing her views or beliefs, thereby hurting that person’s sense of dignity 
and self-respect. Yet he concedes that “[a]n argument that is based the value of 
liberty as an emotional outlet and means of personal development is not 
restricted to speech alone.”83 He also fails to recognize that restricting specific 
speech in particular circumstances rarely stifles a person from expressing her 
views in alternative permissible ways, and thus can hardly be said to 
substantially infringe upon the right for self-expression.84 
Greenawalt himself acknowledges that what he calls the dignity and equality 
justification is closely related to the recognition of autonomy and rationality.85 
81 Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 22, at 153. See also KENT 
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 27-28, 33-34 (1989). 
82 Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 22, at 153. 
83 GREENAWALT, supra note 81, at 28.    
84 See Statman, supra note 78, at 576-77. 
85 Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 22, at 152. 
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He also questions whether “concerns about dignity and equality may seem not to 
be specially related to speech but to be arguments, perhaps rather weak ones, in 
favor of liberty generally.”86 Nonetheless, although Greenawalt raises some of 
the difficulties in recognizing dignity as an independent free speech justification, 
he fails to persuade as to why dignity should be considered as such, as well as 
how exactly this justification is sufficiently distinguishable from other free 
speech justifications, in particular the argument from autonomy. 
It appears that Greenawalt’s attempt to present a detailed and distinguishable 
taxonomy of free speech justifications went one step too far. Greenawalt 
describes his analysis of free speech justifications as an attempt to “provide some 
antidote for confusion and for oversimplification, the main disease of legal and 
philosophical scholarship.”87 While his ambitious endeavor is quite remarkable, 
it may suffer from over-complication.88 There is no real merit in distinguishing 
the “argument from dignity” from the “argument from autonomy,” even if one 
attempts to thoroughly dissect and distinguish the different free speech 
justifications.  
Although Greenawalt refrains from referring to any specific theorist who 
endorses the arguments from dignity and equality, one may assume he is 
primarily referring to Ronald Dworkin.89 Dworkin’s works emphasize an 
account of a dignity-based free speech justification which is parallel to 
Greenawalt’s account. For the sake of a fair analysis of Dworkin’s view of 
dignity and equality as free speech justifications, it is important to relate to the 
broader context of his works. Dworkin, probably the most esteemed legal 
philosopher alive, generally tends to use the values of equality and dignity as the 
primary values for a moral reading of the American Constitution.90 Although his 
writings over the years have offered more than one version of justifications for 
rights in general and free speech in particular,91 it is fair to characterize his view 
of dignity and equality as the primary moral justifications for rights.  
Dworkin’s free speech justification that relies on dignity and equality is, in 
fact, a version of an autonomy justification (or of a general non-discrimination 
 
86 Id. at 153.  
87 Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 22, at 119.  
88 Cf. Brison, Autonomy Defense, supra note 21, at 313 n.5.  
89 Surprisingly, in Greenawalt’s brief account of the dignity and equality justifications he 
does not offer even one footnote to support his analysis or offer reference to other scholars who 
hold this view. See Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 22, at 152-53.  
90 See generally DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2. For criticism of 
Dworkin’s views on the moral reading of the Constitution, see, for example, Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Freedom from Unreal Loyalties: On Fidelity in Constitutional Interpretation, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1773 (1997). 
91 Cf. Brison, Autonomy Defense, supra note 21, at 339. Dworkin’s writings on these issues 
spread over several decades and evolved over time. The portrayal above relates to his later works 
where the focus on dignity and equality is more evident and fully developed.   
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justification). Dworkin views all kinds of speech as protected under this 
justification, not only political speech.92 Thus, his argument for the protection of 
free speech has a broad implication of a principled objection towards the 
limitation of any kind of speech. This is a nonconsequentialist justification (or in 
Dworkin’s words a constitutive justification) that exists side by side with the 
instrumental justifications to free speech (such as the truth and democracy 
arguments).93 
Dworkin believes that the government cannot discriminate among citizens by 
permitting some views and denying other views. Such conduct is discriminatory 
not only to the speaker but also to the society as a whole (or potential individual 
listeners).94 The paternalism applied by government when censoring certain 
opinions deprives the citizenry from exercising autonomy and choosing from all 
available views, including those that the government dislikes or finds distasteful 
or dangerous. As Dworkin puts it, “we retain our dignity, as individuals, only by 
insisting that no one—no official and no majority—has the right to withhold an 
opinion form us on the ground that we are not fit to hear and consider it.”95 In 
other places, Dworkin emphasizes the egalitarian role of the First Amendment by 
saying that “First Amendment liberty is not equality’s enemy, but the other side 
of equality’s coin.”96 
Although Dworkin’s powerful writing is thought provoking, it is hard to 
distinguish, for example, Dworkin’s earlier accounts of justification of free 
speech protection as a negative right,97 from newer accounts of dignity and 
equality. It seems as if Dworkin is simply trying to rearticulate these two leading 
values as more appropriately covered by autonomy or liberty concerns. In any 
case, he fails to convince why it is doctrinally correct to view these issues 
through the lens of dignity rather than autonomy, and why dignity concerns 
should always work in favor of the speaker, even when they patently and 
 
92 Compare DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 195-213 with SCHAUER,
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY, supra note 22, at 65 (claiming that the restriction of political speech 
that limits the ability to meaningfully participate in the political process harms equality, but 
should be more appropriately categorized under the “argument from democracy.”). 
93 See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 209. 
94 See id. note 2, at 200. 
95 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 200. See also Ronald Dworkin, 
Women and Pornography, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 21, 1993 (Only one answer is consistent with 
the ideals of political equality: that no one may be prevented from influencing the shared moral 
environment, through his own private choices, tastes, opinions, and example, just because these 
tastes or opinions disgust those who have the power to shut him up or lock him up.”). 
96 Id. Dworkin also claims that “equality demands that everyone, no matter how eccentric or 
despicable, have a chance to influence policies as well as elections,” and that “equality demands 
that everyone’s opinion be given a chance for influence, not that anyone’s opinion will triumph 
or even be represented in what government eventually does.” Id.
97 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Liberty and Pornography, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 15, 1991 
[hereinafter Dworkin, Liberty and Pornography]. 
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potently infringe upon others’ dignity.98 
The question is whether one can develop a free-speech theory that is based in 
a particular conception of what human dignity entails is possible, and whether 
the contours they chose will be upheld by others. The employment of human 
dignity as a touchstone for doctrine on speech is problematic if its base is 
manipulable. As shown below, since a human dignity-based regime may be more 
prone to suppress speech, the mere use of human dignity as a free speech 
justification is a cause for concern. 
As discussed below, the minimalist account of the argument from dignity is 
compatible with American understandings of rights and of human dignity. Also, 
the minimalist account for the argument from dignity is actually not distinct 
enough to justify separating it from the argument from autonomy. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that it was articulated in the above manner by American scholars. 
 
2. An Expansive Account  
 
A broader view of the possible relationship between human dignity and 
freedom of expression attributes more meaning to human dignity and 
acknowledges the potential of conflict between the two – a conflict that the first 
account disregards. The principal scholar who points out the problematic 
theoretical nexus between dignity and speech is Fredrick Schauer. 
Schauer questions the merits of using human dignity as a foundation for the 
protection of speech and raises several difficulties with this approach. His most 
important contribution questions the implicit premise behind the minimalist 
account that human dignity serves only as a justification for protection of speech. 
He demonstrates how some accounts of human dignity can serve as rationales for 
restricting speech, and therefore questions the suitability of human dignity as a 
free speech justification.  
From a theoretical standpoint, it is hard to see how human dignity can cover 
all types of speech, when it patently stands at odds with some types of speech. 
Human dignity is most effective and relevant for protecting self-regarding 
speech.99 But if this is the case, then the argument from dignity is not an 
argument for protecting speech simpliciter, or even an argument for protecting 
the kind of speech that is commonly protected in the United States, but rather, it 
 
98 Cf. Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 22, at 151; SCHAUER,
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY, supra note 22, at 60-66.   
99 Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, supra note 78, at 189 (“The use of dignity-based 
conceptions of protecting choice as a way of protecting speech thus hinges on the assumption 
that the decision to speak is either in general or in particular cases not a choice that will infringe 
on the rights or the dignity of others. But we have seen that the assumption that speech in general 
cannot and does not infringe on the dignity or the rights of others is untrue. Consequently, it must 
be only some linguistic and pictorial acts that would be protected under this conception of 
freedom of speech as instantiating a choice-based protection of dignity.”) (emphasis in original). 
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is an argument only for protecting substantially self-regarding speech.100 
A focus on dignity as a free speech justification falls short of satisfactorily 
covering many kinds of speech. Unlike the arguments from truth and democracy, 
which clearly relate directly to free speech, it is unclear what work is being done 
by the “dignity” component of the free speech equation. It seems that human 
dignity is generally applicable to non-speech settings,101 since the protection of 
dignity as protection of self-regarding choice would protect both linguistic and 
non-linguistic self-regarding choices.102 It is apparent, therefore, that “trying to 
tailor a speech-protective conception of dignity as choice to the need to avoid 
protecting harmful choices leads to a dropping of speech qua speech from the 
analysis.”103 
Human dignity and freedom of expression do not share a common grounding 
in their theoretical justifications. While freedom of expression has several 
classical justifications, just some of them overlap with human dignity 
rationales.104 The “democratic” and “truth” arguments that stand at the base of 
freedom of expression, and that normally receive the highest level of 
constitutional protection,105 are not covered by the blanket of human dignity. The 
contours that the human dignity blanket covers are limited, and do not even 
cover some of the core expressions such as political speech. Thus, because of its 
formative role in self-conception, artistic speech may receive greater protection 
than political speech under human dignity rationales,106 deviating from the 
current paradigm under which political speech receives the highest protection.  
Although human dignity and freedom of expression are not necessarily 
contradictory, and in some cases may even be compatible, it would be a wrong to 
assume that the two are compatible and should be analyzed through the 
seemingly unifying lens of human dignity. Framing freedom of expression in 
terms of human dignity reduces freedom of expression from its existing 
parameters according to current predominant free speech understandings.107 In 
 
100 Id. This view is compatible with Justice Dorner’s dicta in CrimA 4463/94 Golan v. The 
Penitentiary Service [1996] IsrSC 50(5) 136, as well as her article Dalia Dorner, The 
Constitutional Protection of Human Dignity, in HUMAN DIGNITY OR ITS DEGRADATION? THE 
TENSION OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN ISRAEL 16, 23-25 (Aluf Hareven & Hen Baram eds. 2000).  
101 Dworkin’s writings also apply a similar rationale in other settings, such as private 
homosexuality, contraception, and pornography. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY,
supra note 2, at 275-76; SCHAUER, PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY, supra note 22, at 65.  
102 Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, supra note 78, at 189. 
103 Id.
104 See supra Part II.A. 
105 See, e.g. WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, THE AMERICAN FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CASES AND MATERIALS 23 (2001). 
106 See infra note 109 and accompanying text.    
107 Cf. Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, supra note 78, at 179 (discussing free speech 
justifications),(“If the principle of freedom of speech is not the instantiation of a more general 
principle of dignity, then it should not be surprising that the two will frequently diverge in 
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addition, human dignity is equally problematic as a supplemental free speech 
justification, because its expansive account conflicts with speech protected under 
other justifications. In these cases, a free speech justification would serve as a 
reason for limiting speech, and this concept is unacceptable. No other free speech 
justification serves as a reason to restrict speech, and any “justification” that may 
have this effect should not be considered as an independent free speech 
justification.  
Obviously, not every limitation on freedom of expression involves harm to 
human dignity. Commercial speech, for example, can hardly be seen as a 
violation of the human dignity of the commercial enterprise.108 However, when 
free speech limitations relate to the essence of the individual’s rights to express 
herself, it is likely to involve degrading treatment that violates human dignity.109 
The paradigmatic cases in which human dignity and freedom of expression 
diverge are what we may refer to as “problematic speech” (such as hate speech, 
libel, and pornography).110 In these cases, speech is used to deprive human 
dignity from an individual or members of a group, due to racial or gender 
considerations.111 For instance, in applying autonomy as self-fulfillment and 
human dignity to hate speech, it may seem more appropriate to apply it to the 
victims of the speech rather than the racist speakers.112 
In fact, the expansive account of the argument from dignity gives a 
consequentialist twist to Dworkin and Greenawalt’s nonconsequentialist 
formulation. It challenges the premise that dignity can serve as a categorical 
justification for protecting speech without ever looking at the consequences of 
that speech and its possible infringements of the dignity of others. Because the 
expansive account has consequentialist traits, it is no longer “immune from 
balancing,113” and may lead to speech restriction. 
 
B.  The Relevance of Human Dignity from a Comparative Perspective 
 
1. The Two Accounts from a Comparative Perspective  
 
extension, with freedom of speech often producing deprivations of dignity, and the desire to 
promote dignity often suggesting restrictions on speech. If this is so, then resolving many hard 
issues by reference to dignity will be question-begging, and consequently it may be necessary at 
times to consider directly which of the values of free speech and dignity is more important.”).   
108 Even under First Amendment doctrines, commercial speech is considered to be low value 
speech that is subjected to heightened regulation. Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 174.  
109 Id.
110 Cf. BOLLINGER, supra note 44 (defining problematic speech).  
111 See Statman, supra note 78, at 577; Brison, Autonomy Defense, supra note 21, at 314; 
Matsuda, supra note 29.    
112 See Statman, supra note 78, at 577.  
113 Cf. Brison, Autonomy Defense, supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
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The two accounts offered above for the “argument from dignity” are parallel 
to comparative understandings of what human dignity is in general and in 
relation to freedom of expression in particular. The minimalist account 
characterizes the American approach, whereas the expansive account 
characterizes the approach of most other western democracies to these issues. 
Thus, intuitively, for an American, human dignity may seem like a justification 
for protecting speech, whereas for a European, human dignity may seem like a 
justification for limiting it.  
In the American system, the debate concerning the nature of the nexus 
between human dignity and freedom of expression may seem insignificant. 
Indeed, although some scholars and jurists argue that human dignity is a central 
value in the American constitutional jurisprudence,114 it does not arise to be a 
prominent or a central value under the common American legal understanding, 
and it is certainly not a recognized right.115 In addition, as discussed above, the 
argument from autonomy, as well as human dignity, are more influential abroad 
than in the United States, especially in relation to non-political speech. 
Therefore, the effect of human dignity on freedom of expression in the United 
States cannot be overreaching. This is also true due to the rule-based First 
Amendment jurisprudence that serves as a “buffer” against “irrelevant 
considerations” affecting its contours and content.116 The minimalist account is 
also compatible with current First Amendment jurisprudence and with key 
doctrines such as content neutrality, which is unique to the American setting in 
its implications. Also, more general constitutional doctrines, such as the anti-
classification rule and the focus on discriminatory intent rather than disparate 
impact,117 are different in the United States than the application of human dignity 
in other countries. Nonetheless, the effects of human dignity on freedom of 
expression in other constitutional settings may reach further. 
Human dignity is a central right and a leading value in many western 
constitutional regimes, especially those formed in the second half of the 
 
114 See generally STEPHAN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005); RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM’S LAW (1996); Murphy, supra note 2. 
115 See Paust, supra note 2; THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND 
AMERICAN VALUES (Michael J. Mayer & William A. Parent eds. 1992). It is noteworthy that 
some State Constitutions (such as Montana, see MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4) explicitly enumerate 
Human Dignity as a right. However, the Federal Constitution prevails when it comes to freedom 
of expression, so the likelihood that state courts would balance human dignity and freedom of 
expression as rights is minuscule. See Matthew O. Clifford and Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts 
on the Meaning and Scope of the Montana Constitution’s “Dignity” Clause with Possible 
Applications, 61 MONT. L. REV. 301 (2000); Heinz Klug, The Dignity Clause of the Montana 
Constitution: May Foreign Jurisprudence Lead the Way to an Expanded Interpretation?, 64 
MONT. L. REV. 133 (2003).  
116 Cf. Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 6, at 54-56 
117 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976).  
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twentieth century.118 In some cases, the right to human dignity is at the focal 
point of nations’ constitutional schemes.119 These systems are also characterized 
by a non-rule-based free expression jurisprudence, which makes them more 
susceptible to, and less protected from, the “irrelevant consideration” of human 
dignity balanced into their free expression doctrines.120 In addition, as discussed 
below, most other western democracies hold different constitutional ideals than 
the United States in regard to enforcement of community values and morals in 
speech regulation, framing free speech as a positive right, and recognition of the 
rights of the audience. These differences may lead those legal systems to adopt 
the expansive account of dignity, and, therefore, are more prone to limit free 
speech due to dignity concerns rather than protecting it. In any case, in most 
western democracies, the debate on the interrelationship between human dignity 
and freedom of expression is far more substantial (than in the United States), and 
carries greater consequences.  
Using human dignity as a free speech justification legitimizes the discourse 
in this field and blunts the tension between the two.  A horizontal balancing 
between freedom of speech and human dignity is facilitated by this discourse, 
resulting in yet another danger threatening freedom of expression: the further 
restriction of speech. Since human dignity has become such a robust right in 
some of the western democracies, and it is so prevalent in the constitutional 
discourse of countries such as Germany, Israel, and South Africa, it is not 
surprising that many judges in those nations frame freedom of expression issues 
in human dignity terms. However, few justices have observed that where human 
dignity and freedom of expression are in conflict, to prevent speech restriction, 
they should be viewed as contending rights.121 
2. The Extent Human Dignity and Autonomy Concerns Affect Different Legal 
Systems – Three Parameters  
 
As mentioned earlier, most western democracies construe the nexus between 
human dignity and freedom of expression as the “expansive account,” whereas in 
the United States the “minimalist account” may seem more appropriate. In order 
to demonstrate why this proposition is correct, I will now attempt to 
contextualize a framework to assist predicting whether a specific legal system is 
more prone to limiting free speech due to human dignity concerns or protecting 
 
118 See, e.g., David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein, Forward, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN 
DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE v-vii (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002). 
119 Germany is a good example for such a system. See generally EBRELE, supra note 25; 
Carmi, supra note 10, at 300-05.  
120 Cf. Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, supra note 78. 
121 See Statman, supra note 78 (referring to the Supreme Court rulings both in Israel and 
South Africa). 
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it.  
Although several variables may be relevant for this kind of prediction, three 
are particularly valuable in determining whether a human dignity focus will 
result in the limitation or protection of free speech in a specific legal system. 
These are: (a) individualism versus communitarianism and paternalism; (b) 
speakers’ focus versus audience focus; and (c) negative rights versus positive 
rights perceptions. The combination of these factors may offer a good predictor 
on how a specific legal system will treat human dignity concerns in its freedom 
of expression jurisprudence.  
 
a. Individualism versus Communitarianism and Paternalism  
 
The constitutional instincts in the United States are far more libertarian than 
in most western democracies, especially when First Amendment doctrine is 
involved. Thus, America’s perception of autonomy and freedom of speech is a 
very individualistic.122 For instance, the content neutrality doctrine, prohibiting 
censorship on grounds of content, can be explained as a commitment to this kind 
of individualism and individual moral responsibility. Consequently, any 
censorship on grounds of content is inconsistent with America’s libertarian 
commitment.123 
As opposed to America’s libertarian origins, communitarian European 
perceptions of fraternity (fraternitU), solidarity, and paternalism, characterize 
most other western democracies.124 In such paternalistic societies, valuing 
certain thoughts above others is essentially limiting speech because of its 
content.  
Even when European courts deal with individual rights, they are usually 
contextualized within “community surroundings.”125 Differences of community 
 
122 See, e.g., Brison, Autonomy Defense, supra note 21; POST, supra note 22, at 9-10, 89-
113, and Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the 
First Amendment, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 297 (1998). See also Kent Greenawalt, who plays with 
themes of “individuals” and “communities” when comparing Canadian and American freedom of 
expression. Yet he states a broader comparative perspective, according to which “[a]ny country’s 
dominant culture will place more or less emphasis on individuals or communities, and this will 
affect the kind of latitude the political branches and courts will afford to speech.” GREENAWALT,
FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 23, at 8-9. 
123 See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 205; Dworkin, Liberty and 
Pornography, supra note 97. 
124 See Kommers, supra note 3, at 694 (“Thus, the political system as seen through the eyes 
of the Federal Constitutional Court is marked indelibly by fraternity as by liberty and equality.”). 
See also SCHAUER, PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY, supra note 22, at 65 (“Many countries recognize a 
strong Free Speech Principle but regulate on the basis of moral and paternalistic principles.”); 
Winfried Brugger, Communitarianism as the Social and Legal Theory behind the German 
Constitution, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 431 (2004).  
125 Kommers, supra note 3, at 694 (“In the German view, human dignity can exist only when 
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and individualism in the context of free speech in Europe and the United States 
are articulated nicely by Sionaidh Douglas-Scott who says that:   
European case law rejects a conception of individuals as being who merely should 
be left to their own devices to make up their own minds about the value of 
expression in the public domain, to be free to ignore it, or to counter it with more 
speech. Such an approach isolates human beings by forcing them to take the 
consequences of painful conduct and ignores the particular susceptibilities of certain 
groups to injury, especially when the offence of the speech seems to be targeted at 
such groups because of their identity. Under the American model, the individual 
will be left to his or her less communal and somewhat atomistic existence.126 
These differences have many reasons. Most European countries have more 
homogenous societies than the United States, making societal common grounds 
seemingly easier to define and reach. The law in these countries is meant to 
facilitate maintaining this collective identity,127 even at the expense of regulating 
certain speech due to its content.   
In addition, the European experience during World War II was a formative 
experience not only for Germany, but for the Continent as a whole. Though the 
United States does not have a positive history when it comes to racial relations 
(e.g. slavery, the Civil War and Jim Crow), the American democracy never 
produced a totalitarian regime as some European countries did, nor did it 
experience the traumatic reaction Europe shared from the War. One of the 
reactions to these experiences was the adoption of human dignity as a leading 
constitutional value.128 
The restriction of some problematic speech, especially group libel and hate 
speech, may be justified from a communitarian viewpoint: holding that a 
restriction of such speech is desirable “not only in order to protect certain groups 
but for the well-being of the society as a whole.129” Maintaining a minimum of 
civility in the public discourse may be viewed as the ultimate goal of such 
restrictions, since permitting vilification harms the society as a whole.130 The 
legal basis that legitimizes these restrictions “can be found in the central 
constitutional principles of equality, human dignity and non-discrimination.”131 
persons are allowed to develop themselves as rational beings in community with others.”). 
126 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Comparison of the 
American and European Approaches, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 305, 343 (1999). 
127 See, e.g., Kommers, supra note 3, at 695 (“In Germany, however, speech is juridically 
valued for its capacity to create community. The German view holds that free speech requires 
persons participating in the forum of public discussion to speak the truth and to do so with 
respect for other persons’ personal honor and dignity. In short, the purpose of political discourse 
in German theory is to create a tradition of civility and a polity of responsible citizens.”). 
128 See, e.g., Kretzmer & Klein, supra note 228, at v-vi.  
129 Roger Errera, Freedom of Speech in Europe and in the USA, supra note 5 at 36.  
130 See id.
131 Id. at 37 (emphasis added).  
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European sensitivity regarding racist speech has not been applied, so far, to 
speech that some say impinges upon gender equality (i.e. pornography). Canada 
is the only western democracy that has so far seriously attempted to restrict 
pornography due to communitarian concerns that relate to dignity and 
equality.132 Nonetheless, Europeans are more susceptible to such a possible 
restriction than Americans.133 
Therefore, while autonomy focuses on the individual in the American 
context, it tends to be an argument that protects all speech. Contrary to the 
American emphasis on individualism, the communitarian conceptualization of 
autonomy and rights in other western democracies, may well lead to autonomy 
and dignity concerns being used to limit speech.  
 
Diagram I: Recognition of Individual and Communal Concerns in Free 
Speech Doctrines   
 
Communitarianism                                                                  Individualism                    
 
Western Democracies                                                       The United States 
 
b. Speakers’ Focus versus Audience Focus  
 
In addition to, or, in fact, as a result of, the different emphases on individual 
and communitarian perception of rights in the United States and Europe, there 
are also different emphases on who holds rights in those societies. In the 
American system, many leading commentators put an emphasis on the rights of 
the speaker and the potential harm to members of the audience is usually 
categorized as infringement on their interests, rather than their rights.134 
132 See, e.g., R. v. Butler [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 449 (“This type of material would, apparently, 
fail the community standards test not because it offends against morals but because it is 
perceived by public opinion to be harmful to society, particularly to women. While the accuracy 
of this perception is not susceptible of exact proof, there is a substantial body of opinion that 
holds that the portrayal of persons being subjected to degrading or dehumanizing sexual 
treatment results in harm, particularly to women and therefore to society as a whole.”).  
133 See, e.g., HCJ 5432/03 Shin v. The Cable and Satellite Council, [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 65; 
HCJ 4804/94 Station Film Co. v. Film Review Bd. [1997] IsrSC 50(5) 661, ¶ 11 (English 
translation available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/94/040/048/z01/94048040.z01.HTM). 
134 See Brison, Autonomy Defense, supra note 21, at 316-18 (critiquing Ronald Dworkin); 
Ronald Dworkin, The Rights of Myron Farber, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 7, 1978; Frederick F. 
Schauer, The Rights of M.A. Farber: An Exchange, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 7, 1978 (saying that 
“Dworkin's analysis prevails automatically over considerations of policy are those that are based 
on the moral rights of the speaker, then it is hard to see why there is such a strong presumption in 
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Normally, rights in general, and the right of free speech in particular, are 
beneficial to the speaker, not at the audience.135 This classic perception of rights 
usually classifies harms to a hypothetical audience as caused by the fulfillment 
of a person’s right as societal interests, and balances these interests as inferior to 
the individual rights, which in the lack of some compelling legal justification 
would be trumped by the rights.136 Therefore, using human dignity to defend 
victims of speech (such as in cases of hate speech or pornography), may be 
argued as a confusion between rights and interests.137 
The determination of whether a certain violation infringes upon rights or 
interests carries great significance. According to the Dworkinian perception 
applied by many western democracies, since only substantial harm that is caused 
by an interest may trump a certain right. This balancing between rights and 
interests is called vertical balancing, and interests rarely win this battle. An 
example of such balancing is the Clear and Present Danger test, which balances 
the right to free speech with society’s interest of security. The test prescribes that 
the prior restraint of speech is permissible only when there is actual or imminent 
danger, such as violence or injuries to others.138 However, if the harm infringes 
upon a right, then two rights are conflicting (e.g. the speaker’s right for free 
speech and the addressee’s right for human dignity). In such a case a horizontal 
balancing is applied, with no inherent strength to any of these rights vis-à-vis the 
competing right.139 While in the United States the harms racial and pornographic 
speech may cause are perceived as interests, they are perceived in other legal 
systems as infringement of rights.140 
Arguments from dignity much more plausibly generate arguments for 
restricting various kinds of speech than for protecting it.141 When a person is 
 
favor of allowing the publication.”).  
135 See Michael Dan Birenhak, Constitutional Engineering – The Supreme Court’s 
Methodology in Value-based Decisions; 19 MECHKARI MISHPAT 591 (2003).Cf. CrimA 3750/94 
Ploni v. Israel [1994] IsrSC 48(4) 621, 630, where Chief Justice Shamgar claims that human 
dignity defends the rights of the victims, and not only the rights of perpetrators.  
136 See Ronald M. Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy 
Waldron ed., 1984). 
137 Cf. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 198-203. Another possible 
construction of this conflict is defining these harms as infringing upon group rights. See, e.g.,
Evan P. Schultz, Group Rights, American Jews, and the Failure of Group Libel Laws, 1913-
1962, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 71, 75-76 (2000).  
138 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969); Nadine Strossen, Hate Speech 
and Pornography: Do We Have to Choose Between Freedom of Speech and Equality?, 46 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 449, 455 (1996).  
139 See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 184-205. 
140 See R. v. Butler [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 449;  HCJ 4804/94 Station Film Co. v. Film Review 
Bd. [1997] IsrSC 50(5) 661 (English translation available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/94/040/048/z01/94048040.z01.HTM), CrimA 3750/94 Ploni 
v. Israel [1994] IsrSC 48(4) 621, 630.   
141 Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, supra note 78, at 184. See also Statman, supra note 78, at 
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vilified because of his race, for example, the harm to his dignity is quite evident. 
Yet, it is harder to articulate the harm to the vilifier’s own dignity, if he is 
prohibited from saying racial slurs. Even so, it seems more plausible to view 
human dignity as protecting the rights of minorities than of racists. A similar 
example may be pornography, where many claim that human dignity naturally 
leads for protecting the “victims” of this speech rather than the publishers.142 
The rights discourse in most western democracies recognizes the rights of the 
audience or the victims, and rejects an exclusive focus on the rights of the 
speaker or perpetrator. Thus, for example, rights of victims are balanced vis-à-vis 
the rights of criminals, and the rights of speakers are balanced vis-à-vis the rights 
of the addressees. For instance, the right to human dignity in Germany is 
interpreted as protecting both the rights of speakers and addresses.143 The Israeli 
Supreme Court has also interpreted the right to human dignity as applying to 
victims as well as perpetrators.144 Canada’s pornography rulings also share a 
similar rationale.145 
Some of the approach towards recognition of audience’s rights may also be 
attributed to the third factor, which relates to the recognition of positive and 
negative rights. 
 
Diagram II: Recognition of Speaker and Audience Rights in Free Speech 
Doctrines  
 
Audience Focus      Speaker Focus                                                 
 
Western Democracies                                                       The United States 
 
c. Negative Rights versus Positive Rights  
 
Whether freedom of expression is construed, as a negative right,146 or as a 
 
576-580.   
142 See Statman, Two Concepts of KAVOD, at 577-78. See also literature on “silencing,” such 
as CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING (Robert Post, ed. 1988). The writings of Catherine MacKinnon 
focus on equality and human dignity as primary justifications for the restriction of pornography.  
See, e.g., CATHERINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993). 
143 Winfried Brugger, Ban On or Protection of Hate Speech? Some Observations Based on 
German and American Law, 17 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 18-19 (2002) (especially note 45 and 
accompanying text). 
144 See CrimA. 3750/94 Ploni v. Israel [1994] IsrSC 48(4) 621, 630 (where Chief Justice 
Shamgar claims that human dignity defends the rights of the victims, and not only with the rights 
of the perpetrators). 
145 See R. v. Butler [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452.   
146 Negative liberty can be briefly characterized as not being obstructed by others in doing 
one might wish to do. See Dworkin, Liberty and Pornography, supra note 97.  
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positive right,147 has a potential effect on the way human dignity on freedom of 
expression.  
The First Amendment is distinctively perceived as protecting a negative 
right. The negative perception of rights is characteristic to American 
constitutional law, but is probably most evident in First Amendment doctrines.148 
Thus, the courts have articulated the First Amendment as guaranteeing “the 
negative liberty of free speech149” and the this choice of framing freedom of 
expression as a negative right is characterized by Dworkin as “the core of the 
choice modern democracies have made.”150 
Yet, it appears that Dworkin’s premise is inaccurate, since most modern 
democracies recognize, to certain degrees, some positive-rights’ aspects of their 
free speech doctrines. Germany is the clearest example for the application of 
rights as positive rights, including when it comes to free expression.151 
Nonetheless, as in the examples given earlier, Germany does not stand alone in 
this trend, and it is followed, usually to a lesser extent, by other western 
democracies such as Canada, Israel, and France.152 
The distinction between the public and the private spheres is also affected by 
positive and negative rights perceptions. If freedom of expression is merely a 
negative right, it basically means that the government is not allowed to censor its 
citizens. However, if rights are construed in a positive manner, government can 
regulate harm that is caused by private actors (e.g. pornographers). Indeed, some 
of the debate regarding the restriction of pornography revolves around the 
classification of right as positive or negative.153 
147 In a nutshell, positive liberty can be characterized as the power to control or participate in 
public decisions, including the decision how far to curtail negative liberty. Dworkin summarizes 
the concept of positive liberty by saying that “in an ideal democracy—whatever that is—the 
people govern themselves. Each is master to the same degree, and positive liberty is secured for 
all.” Id. Also, see generally ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (Oxford Univ. Press, 
1968). 
148 See Brison, Autonomy Defense, supra note 21, at 339.   
149 Dworkin, Liberty and Pornography, supra note 97, at n.4.  See, e.g., Am. Booksellers 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327 (1985), aff'd 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (Judge Easterbrook 
wrote that “the government must leave to the people the evaluation of ideas.”).  
150 Cf. Dworkin, Liberty and Pornography, supra note 97 (“Freedom of speech, conceived 
and protected as a fundamental negative liberty, is the core of the choice modern democracies 
have made, a choice we must now honor in finding our own ways to combat the shaming 
inequalities women still suffer.”). 
151 See Dieter Grimm, Human Rights and Judicial Review in Germany, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 267, 283 (David Beatty ed., 1994) 
(referring to the German jurisprudential perception of “protective duties” (Schutzpflicht)). 
152 See, e.g., ERIC M. BRANDT, BROADCASTING LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 13-19 (1995). 
153 See, e.g., Dworkin, Liberty and Pornography, supra note 97 (“But the most imaginative 
feminist literature for censorship makes a further and different argument: that negative liberty for 
pornographers conflicts not just with equality but with positive liberty as well, because 
pornography leads to women's political as well as economic or social subordination.”). 
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Diagram III: Recognition of Negative and Positive Rights in Free Speech 
Doctrines  
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As we can see, the parameters reviewed above align with American and 
European free speech perceptions. The United States is clearly individualistic, 
speaker-focused, and based on negative rights. Most other western democracies 
are quite clearly on the opposite side due to their recognition and application of 
community values, audience/victims rights, and positive rights. These 
differences set apart the United States from the rest of western democracies. This 
may serve as yet another explanation for American Exceptionalism and for why 
in America human dignity is perceived as having different implications on free 
speech than elsewhere.   
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IV. CONCLUSION:
DRIVING A WEDGE BETWEEN FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY  
Speaking of speech in human dignity terms may be a two-edged sword. As 
Schauer notes, the “conflation of dignity and speech, as a general proposition, is 
mistaken, for although speaking is sometimes a manifestation of the dignity of 
the speaker, speech is also often the instrument through use of which the dignity 
of others is deprived.”154 Both freedom of expression and human dignity may 
gain by untying this “Gordian knot.” From a theoretical perspective, a 
construction of conflict rather than unity between these two constitutional 
concepts155 is preferable.156 
To drive a wedge between the principles of dignity and free speech is not to suggest 
that dignity is not a primary human good. Nor is it to suggest that free speech, as a 
constraint on the ability of some agent in control to limit the communication of 
some agent under control, is not also a good thing. But noting that dignity and 
speech are not necessarily conjoined leads to the conclusion that the values of free 
speech and preservation of dignity will often collide. When that is the case, 
considering the instances in which an act of speech is an expression of dignity will 
be of little assistance. Consequently, thinking seriously about dignity may cause us 
either to recognize its irrelevance to free speech theory or to reevaluate some of that 
theory itself. 157 
This wedge between the principles of dignity and free speech exists in the 
American setting, inter alia, in the form of the rule-based First Amendment 
jurisprudence.158 It is lacking in most European systems, which are non-rule-
based, and deploy constitutional “balancing” in cases that involve freedom of 
expression.159 
A prime justification for this wedge is the potential for misapplication of the 
term “human dignity.” Ronald Dworkin, throughout his writings, warns of the 
confusion of terms. For example, he repeatedly cautions against the conflation of 
interests, values, and rights.160 Framing a free speech justification in human 
 
154 Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, supra note 78, at 179. 
155 I deliberately use the term “constitutional concepts,” and not rights or values, since, as I 
show in this paper, the term human dignity may be regarded as either a right or a value (or even 
both), but this determination may vary among different legal systems and different 
circumstances, and may carry practical consequences.  
156 Cf. Statman, supra note 73, at 579. According to Statman, construing the conflict 
between human dignity and freedom of expression in terms of conflicting rights, rather than 
viewing human dignity as part of the justification for freedom of expression, offers a clearer 
conceptualization of this tension. Id. at 578-79.   
157 Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, supra note 78, at 179. 
158 See Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 6, at 53-56.  
159 See Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication, supra note 4, at 49-53; O’Neil, supra 
note 30, at 30. 
160 See generally DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2. 
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dignity terms leads to such a possible confusion, so the connection between 
freedom of expression and human dignity (or equality) may by construed as 
legitimizing the limitation of speech. Avoiding this confusion may be facilitated 
by keeping human dignity and free speech doctrinally separated.  
In advocating for the separation of dignity and speech I am not saying that 
dignity is less important than freedom of expression. 161 Rather, I am simply 
saying that dignity is irrelevant for free speech protection, and should be 
regarded as an external constraint on free speech rather than an internal 
justification.  
Labels matter. If freedom of expression is articulated in human dignity terms, 
it would not be long before someone who has neglected to fully understand the 
delicate nature of this connection would mistakenly interpret it in a very different 
way than Dworkin and Greenawalt understand it. Furthermore, the minimalist 
account of human dignity does not reflect many western legal systems’ 
understanding of rights and human dignity. In these cases, human dignity sends 
mixed signals as to the protection or limitation of speech. Therefore, the possible 
harm of juxtaposing freedom of expression with dignity and equality may well 
exceed the benefits of distinguishing the “argument from dignity” from the 
“argument from autonomy.”  
Autonomy is not affiliated with the same values as dignity, and is perceived 
more in a libertarian way than dignity or equality, both in Europe and the United 
States. Keeping an emphasis on autonomy (or liberty) does not carry the same 
risks, or at least significantly decreases the chances for possible term confusion 
and its undesirable consequences.162 
Autonomy is mainly (and intuitively) affiliated with libertarian values, and is 
therefore more compatible with the American paradigm to free speech. As 
opposed to autonomy, prevalent perceptions of human dignity, especially outside 
the United States, are communitarian.163 Although autonomy may be interpreted 
as accommodating communitarian concerns,164 and human dignity may be 
interpreted as accommodating libertarian concerns,165 both instances are 
 
161 Cf. Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, supra note 78, at 190-191 (“As a differential protection 
for or immunization of various other-regarding and harm-protecting acts under circumstances in 
which the same harms would justify official intervention, freedom of speech is different in 
dramatic ways from most other individual rights, and thus the idea of dignity, which is highly 
relevant to thinking about many other rights, may be much less relevant in thinking about 
freedom of speech.”) (emphasis added). 
162 Compare Dworkin, Liberty and Pornography, supra note 97, with Frank Michelman, 
Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: the Case of Pornography 
Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV 291, 303-04 (1989).   
163 Cf. Post, supra note 22, at 23-116 (affiliating human dignity with community), Brugger, 
supra note 31, at 72-74. 
164 See Michelman, supra note 163, at 303-04, and Brison, Autonomy Defense, supra note 
21, at 336-38 passim.
165 See discussion on Dworkin and Greenawald at supra Part III.A.1. 
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peripheral interpretations. The mainstream understandings of both terms lean on 
different heritages.166 When it comes to free speech justifications, it is more 
appropriate to lean on classic liberal perceptions than communitarian 
perceptions. Therefore, although autonomy is not the silver bullet to the 
problems human dignity presents, it is still far better, since the human dignity-
based regime is more prone to suppressing speech.  
The “argument from dignity,” in its narrow sense, is not sufficiently 
distinguishable from the “argument from autonomy.” The latter actually captures 
and conceptualizes the minimalist view of the “argument from dignity” quite 
adequately, and does not carry similar potential misunderstandings as does the 
former. This “slippery slope” argument may seem unsubstantiated to the 
American reader because, in the American context, human dignity (and equality) 
carries different meanings than in most other western democracies. Yet, as 
demonstrated above, this should be a genuine concern in other legal settings. 
When Greenawalt and Dworkin articulated their view as to the “argument from 
dignity” they did so from an American perspective, and may have overlooked 
the non-American approach that sheds a different light on their arguments.  
Free speech justifications must be aimed at protecting speech – not 
restricting it. Recognition of human dignity among these justifications, with all 
its abovementioned potential interpretations that are speech-restricting, is simply 
a bad idea. On one hand, speech-protecting features of the “argument from 
dignity,” namely the minimalist account, are not sufficiently discernable from 
existing justifications. Moreover, it is doubtful how exactly these arguments are 
free speech justifications as opposed to general principles for the protection of 
all rights. On the other hand, the more expansive “argument form dignity” is not 
a justification for protecting free speech, since it is also a potential justification 
for the limitation of speech. Therefore, free speech protection has very little to 
gain from affiliation with human dignity, and discourse that aligns the two might 
prove a “Trojan Horse” with dignity as “the enemy from within.”  
 
166 See discussion supra Part I (regarding the communitarian sources of human dignity and 
libertarian sources of American rights discourse).  
